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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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AGDA-A(M) (31 Mar 71)

FOR OT UT 704015

SUBJECT: Operational Report (6) Lessons Learned, Headquarters, ~~XXXV~~
Corps ~~31 October 1970 (U)~~

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1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.
2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.
3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Verne L. Bowers
VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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9 Operational report for
quarterly period ending
31 Oct 70.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, XXIV CORPS
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AVII GGT

22 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,
Period Ending 31 October 1970, HCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

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The enclosed Operational Report - Lessons Learned is forwarded in compliance with AR 520-15.

FOR THE COMMANDER.

L. E. PROCTOR
LTJG (P)
Acting Adjutant General

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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AVII-GCT

12 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20320

1. (C) Operations - Significant Activities.

a. (U) Command and Organization.

(1) Command.

(a) On 21 August 1970, Major General William E. Shedd III, Chief of Staff, departed for CONUS and Brigadier General Robert C. Hixon assumed duty as Chief of Staff.

(b) On 5 October 1970, Colonel Walter W. Hixson, (USMC), Deputy Chief of Staff, departed PCS for CONUS and Colonel Robert W. Kersey, (USMC), assumed duty as Deputy Chief of Staff.

(2) Organization.

(a) The 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery was assigned to XXIV Corps and further attached to XXIV Corps Artillery on 1 October 1970.

(b) On 1 September 1970 the Combined Action Force was released from OPCON and reverted to III Marine Amphibious Force control for subsequent redeployment.

b. (C) Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

(1) General Enemy Situation.

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12 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XIIIV Corps,
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(a) Summary: The most significant development within the reporting period was the reorganization of Viet Cong local forces in southern Military Region I. In Quang Nam Province, several district units were reorganized as battalion size units. In Quang Tin Province, a few North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units were disbanded and the personnel sent to the local forces as replacements. The enemy withheld his main units (2d NVA Division 141st NVA Infantry Regiment) from battle, relying on the local forces instead. In Northern Military Region I, the enemy continued his consolidation of bases in the western areas and maintained his attempts to expand to the east. There was no significant increase in strength levels, which remained high.

(b) Quang Tri Province.

1 During the reporting period enemy activity in Quang Tri Province was characterized by harassment of Allied installations. Enemy activity was not as high or as intense as it was during the previous reporting period.

2 In the Demilitarized Zone area, enemy mining appeared to be on the upswing in the Cua Viet River area. On 27 September 1970, seven mines were found in the Cua Viet river. One exploded in a fisherman's net, two detonated from undetermined cause, two exploded during a sweep, one was reported by a fisherman and one was recovered. A recovery team working on a previously mined junk at the mouth of the Cua Viet River discovered an 850 pound Russian manufactured water mine. Few of these devices have been detected in South Vietnam to date. During the period 8 through 14 October 1970, 1st Coastal Reconnaissance sources indicated the probable movement of 1,000 kilos of explosives and detonation devices from the Demilitarized Zone to forward areas in preparation for mining operations in the Cua Viet River. Local Viet Cong supply cells were to provide assistance in the infiltration and placement of the mines under the probable direction of units of the 126th Naval Sapper Regiment.

3 Along the southern trace of the Demilitarized Zone, fire support bases were frequently targeted during August and September 1970. These attacks slackened during October 1970 with the exception of the Fire Support Base Fuller area where the 84th Artillery Regiment and elements of the 27th Regiment are currently operating. Daily rocket and mortar attacks on Fuller from 12 through 16 October 1970 caused negligible casualties and damage despite the 146 rounds that were received.

4 In Western Quang Tri Province, aerial observation indicated increased foot traffic on 8 October 1970. Cavalry elements of C Troop,

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3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry engaged an unknown size enemy force three km west of Lang Vei, killing 29 NVA and capturing documents which indicated that the enemy unit was composed of inexperienced troops probably engaged in road building west of the Laotian Salient. Sensor activations on Route 9 south of Khe Sanh indicated increased activity.

5 The major incident in Quang Tri Province was the entry of the 808th Battalion, 7th Front and the 3d Battalion, 9th Regiment into Hai Lang District on 12 August 1970. Although the attacks were not combined, they were apparently coordinated. This foray cost the enemy 315 KIA and 30 detainees while Allied losses numbered 22 KIA and 48 WIA. On 17 October 1970, elements of the 808th Battalion made their first tactical appearance since Hai Lang with an attempted ambush of 2d Battalion, 7th ARVN Cavalry Regiment units north of Fire Support Base Barbara. The enemy suffered 10 KIA in the engagement.

(c) Thua Thien Province.

1 Again during this reporting period, enemy activity was highest around fire support bases in the western portion of the province. The enemy conducted sporadic attacks in the lowlands against population centers and installations.

2 Fire Support Base O'Reilly was the most prominent enemy target until the base was closed on 1 October 1970. The enemy pressed hard after the closing of Fire Support Base Ripcord but never succeeded in pinning Allied Forces to the confines of the fire base. The introduction of 120mm mortars against Fire Support Base O'Reilly on 7 September 1970 was believed to initiate the second phase of a three-phase operation to force evacuation of the base or overrun it. Toward the end of September and in early October 1970, enemy attacks on and around Fire Support Base O'Reilly decreased. Sporadic ground contact continued south of the base, however, with 13 NVA KIA in two skirmishes on 13 and 15 October 1970.

3 In the lowlands, enemy forces conducted attacks by fire on Phu Bai on 2 August and 28 August 1970, accounting for seven US WIA. On 3 and 30 August 1970, enemy forces conducted attacks by fire on Camp Evans. Two more attacks by fire were reported in the camp on 1 September 1970. Hue City was targeted twice during the reporting period. The first attack by four 122mm rockets on 6 August 1970 resulted in 14 ARVN KIA and 63 WIA. The second attack on 28 September 1970 caused no casualties or damage. Camp Eagle received 12 122mm rockets on 28 August

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1970, resulting in one US WIA. Other significant incidents in the low-lands were minings on the Hue-Danang Railroad and sniper fire at convoys on QL 1. Regional Force troops successfully ambushed an unidentified enemy unit on 11 October 1970 near Fire Support Base Viper, killing seven NVA.

(d) Quang Nam Province.

1. Enemy activity in Quang Nam Province was low during the reporting period with several notable exceptions. On the night of 8-9 August 1970, there was an increase in attacks by fire on friendly units and installations. During the period 30 August through 2 September 1970 and from 3 to 5 October 1970, the enemy again attempted to achieve results through attacks by fire and limited ground contacts.

2. A major incident was the attack on Duc Duc District Headquarters on 30 August 1970 which began with a 50 round mortar barrage followed by a sapper attack against a hospital and Buddhist orphanage. Ten civilians were killed and 44 wounded, most of them children.

3. On 1 September and 12 October 1970, enemy gunners fired eight 122mm and seven 140mm rockets respectively into the Danang Airfield area. The latter attack killed four civilians, wounded one and slightly damaged one aircraft and a building.

4. Increased enemy emphasis on the Thuong Duc District Headquarters and Civilian Irregular Defense Group Camp began on 29 September 1970 with 12 rounds of 122mm rockets which caused no casualties or damage. On 2 October 1970, both the district town and the Civilian Irregular Defense Group Camp received attacks by fire. Daily rocket and mortar attacks continued from 6 through 10 October 1970 inflicting light casualties and damage. On 13 and 14 October 1970 the enemy again struck the Thuong Duc area with 12 rounds of 122mm rockets. On 15 October 1970, a ground contact southeast of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group Camp resulted in the capture of a PW who stated he was from the 2d Company, 11th Battalion, 38th Regiment. Attacks by fire continued on the 16th and 17th of October 1970 with district headquarters and friendly night defensive positions targeted. Forty-five rounds of mixed recoilless rifle and mortar fire wounded 10 Civilian Irregular Defense Group troops while five 122mm rockets killed eight Vietnamese civilians and wounded 14 others. In the early morning of 20 October 1970, eight 122mm rockets struck the Civilian Irregular Defense Group Camp causing slight damage and no casualties.

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5 In spite of the relatively low level of overt military activity in Quang Nam Province, recruiting, proselyting, and propagandizing continued.

(e) Quang Tin Province.

1 Quang Tin was relatively quiet during the reporting period with the exception of 3-4 October 1970 when there was an increase in activity.

2 Among the more significant actions were the attacks by fire on Chu Lai Airbase. The first occurred on 9 September 1970 and consisted of nine 122mm rockets resulting in no casualties or damage. The second attack on 15 September 1970 consisted of only two 122mm rockets but confirmed the interest in Chu Lai as a target. On 4 October 1970, the Nui Me outpost was the target for a mortar and ground attack from an estimated enemy company, believed to be the V-16 Sapper Company. Results of the attack were 11 friendly KIA and nine WIA while the enemy suffered 11 KIA.

3 Throughout the period Quang Tin Provincial Unit forces seemed preoccupied with resupply, training and refitting. A number of short attacks by fire and harassment of outposts were reported. On 13 October 1970, 3-5 ARVN Regiment contacted an unknown size enemy force 12 km SE of Hoi An, killing 25 enemy while losing one killed and one wounded.

(f) Quang Ngai Province

1 Quang Ngai forces, except during the period 2-3 September 1970 when numerous small attacks were reported concentrated on resupply. Recent large cache discoveries by Allied Forces will apparently keep enemy forces occupied in the logistics and transportation field.

2 Among the more notable enemy initiated activities were the attacks against Tra Bong and Landing Zone Stinson on 8 September 1970. Tra Bong Ranger Border Defense Camp and District Headquarters were struck with 100 rounds of mortar and rockets followed by a sapper attack. Friendly losses were 43 KIA and 56 WIA while the enemy suffered 52 KIA and seven PW. The attack was primarily if not wholly the work of the 406th Sapper Battalion. Also on 8 September 1970, enemy units hit Landing Zone Stinson with 82 rounds of mortar followed by a ground attack. Friendly losses were 14 WIA with enemy casualties undetermined. Other contacts both friendly and enemy initiated occurred on 8 September 1970, making it the most intense period of activity during the quarter.

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3 Attacks by fire on Regional Force units on 2, 3 and 11 October 1970 caused light casualties while three mortar attacks on 8 October 1970, totalling 90 rounds of assorted mortar rounds, left two friendly WIA.

4 On 11 October 1970, the 315th Regional Force Company successfully ambushed an unknown size enemy force killing nine enemy while losing one friendly KIA.

(2) Intelligence Collection.

(a) General: The Collection Division (Interrogation of Prisoners of War, Ground Reconnaissance, Ground Surveillance and Technical Intelligence) continued to provide timely collateral intelligence information to the ACofS, G2. The division evaluated and distributed seven COMUSMACV Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICR) and published three XXIV Corps SICR's during the quarter. The XXIV Corps Collection Plan and EEI were updated and disseminated.

(b) Interrogation of Prisoners of War. A total of 219 detainees were interrogated in Military Region 1. The breakdown by classification of these detainees is as follows:

<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>%</u>
NVA/HC	16	7.3	NVA/IW	87	39.7
VC/HC	<u>37</u>	<u>16.9</u>	VC/IW	<u>79</u>	<u>36.1</u>
TOTAL	53	24.2	TOTAL	166	75.8

XXIV Corps Interrogation of Prisoners of War Branch interrogated 77 of these detainees. Documents captured by the ROK Marines and Regional Force and Popular Force Forces in Military Region 1 were obtained for the first time. These documents were borrowed from the capturing unit and were copied by the Interrogation of Prisoners of War Branch. The copies were then forwarded to the Combined Document Exploitation Center for exploitation and readouts.

(c) Ground Reconnaissance.

1 Ground Reconnaissance activity in Military Region 1 continues to produce positive results. During this quarter, some 600 ground reconnaissance teams were inserted in Military Region 1 on intelligence

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information collection missions. Teams produced 334 sightings totalling over 1716 enemy personnel observed and 92 contacts. Contacts, combined with air and artillery strikes called in response to enemy sightings, resulted in 169 enemy KIA in addition to providing information on enemy personnel movements, base camps, and troops concentrations.

2 ARVN long range reconnaissance teams in Military Region 1 contributed substantially to the above results. ARVN units deployed 146 patrols resulting in 15 enemy troop sightings totalling over 29 enemy personnel and 11 contacts. Contacts, combined with air and artillery strikes called in response to enemy sightings, resulted in 21 KIA.

3 On 18 August 1970, Quang Da Special Zone long range reconnaissance program became operational. Quang Da Special Zone has established four long range reconnaissance teams and strives to maintain two teams deployed daily. Teams are inserted and extracted by Vietnamese Air Force or US Army helicopters.

(d) Ground Surveillance. Phase III of the sensor program was initiated in Military Region 1. The first of Phase III channels were allocated in August 1970. Air and land implant sensors, plus Portatales were received by 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division and 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) during the month of September 1970. In October 1970, the Deployable Air Relay Terminal (DART) was converted to Phase III operation while retaining its Phase I capability. US Air Force seeded Phase III sensors in northernmost Military Region 1, and the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division converted Phase III implant in its Area of Operations. Plans were finalized to use 1st Marine Aircraft Wing OV-10 aircraft for Phase III sensor implant in areas inaccessible for ground implant and too hazardous for helicopter implant. The following actions are being accomplished in the Vietnamization of the sensor program:

- 1 Inclusion of ARVN in the Phase III program.
- 2 Integration of ARVN personnel in sensor management, XXIV Corps.
- 3 Staffing of proposal by 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division to integrate ARVN and US in a combined sensor operations center.
- 4 Initiation of sensor training program for Vietnamese Navy personnel.

(e) Technical Intelligence. A total of 163 war trophy items were

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registered by the Technical Intelligence Branch during the quarter. The total includes 87 rifles, 49 pistols and 27 miscellaneous items such as knives and crossbows.

(3) Weather.

(a) The weather pattern over Military Region 1 during the period of August-October 1970 was characterized by unseasonably good weather. Military operations were relatively unhampered by weather with the exception of two instances during the second half of the period.

(b) The first frontal surge of the season brought exceedingly poor weather conditions to Military Region 1 during the last few days of September and early October 1970. Extremely low cloudiness and poor visibility reduced air operations to a minimum while heavy rains, with associated flooding, brought ground operations to a virtual standstill. Timely notification of the expected frontal surge resulted in at least eight hours warning time on the low cloudiness and at least twelve hours warning time on the onset of heavy rains.

(c) During the period of 15-16 October 1970, Typhoon Joan posed a brief threat to operations in Military Region 1. Several operations were cut short and participating personnel and equipment returned to their base of operations to prepare for the oncoming typhoon. Winds gusting as high as 50 knots were recorded in Southern Military Region 1 and upper level winds were recorded in excess of 110 knots. The advanced warning given to commanders gave them ample time to make all necessary preparations.

(d) During the period, climatological planning data was provided to commanders involved in such Allied operations as Jefferson Glen, Wolfe Mountain, Texas Star, Elk Canyon, Frederick Hill, Nantucket Beach, Iron Mountain, Geneva Park, Pennsylvania Square and Arc Light operations.

(e) Climatological weather information was provided by this unit for use in planning and coordinating joint Army-Air Force reconnaissance missions.

(f) Climatological planning data emphasized the inadvisability of leaving several fire support bases in operation during the northeast monsoon. Resupply could have been hampered by adverse weather for extended periods of time.

c. (C) Plans and Operations.

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Period Ending 31 October 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(1) Boundary Changes.

(a) The permanent boundary in western Quang Tri Province was changed on 5 August 1970 since the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (MECH) received additional air cavalry assets for assistance in patrolling the Demilitarized Zone area. The reconnaissance zone of the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) was assigned to the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (MECH). The responsibility for this area was then further assigned to C Troop, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry.

(b) On 21 September 1970, the permanent boundary between the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) and 1st Marine Division was changed to generally follow the Thua Thien/Quang Nam Provincial boundary. This change took advantage of the air cavalry assets of the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) in patrolling a major enemy infiltration area. The 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) gained the basin of the Rong Rong Valley and a portion of the Elephant Valley areas.

(c) On 22 September 1970, the permanent boundary of the 2d ROKMC Brigade was moved north into the 1st Marine Division area to encompass all of Dien Ban District. The change made the 2d ROKMC Brigade boundary coincide with the Dien Ban District boundary and assisted in case of control of Vietnamese forces within a single district.

(d) On 10 October 1970, the central portion of the southern permanent boundary of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (MECH) was moved south into the area of the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL). This change gave the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (MECH) sole responsibility for a major base and infiltration area, running northeast-southwest, consisting of approximately 400 square kilometers.

(2) The following operations terminated during the reporting period:

(a) CHISAGO PEAK (Initially Named CHICAGO PEAK). This operation commenced on 25 July 1970 and employed elements of the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) and 1st ARVN Infantry Division. The basic mission was to increase the security of the populated lowlands and support operations in the enemy's rear service support area in the mountains northeast of the A Shau Valley. This operation was part of Operation Texas Star. The operation terminated on 13 August 1970 with the following results.

<u>KIA</u>	<u>FRIENDLY</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>	<u>CSMC</u>
				<u>TWC</u>	
3 ARVN		2 US	97	18	14
		42 ARVN			

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(b) PICKENS FOREST. This operation was conducted by the 1st Marine Division in the Song Thu Bon Valley. The mission was to destroy the enemy and his facilities and interdict his logistical support. The operation supported the I ARVN Corps/PWMAF, Military Region 1, Combined Summer Military Campaign Plan. It commenced on 15 July 1970 and terminated on 24 August 1970 with the following results.

<u>FRIENDLY</u>		<u>ENEMY</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IWC</u>	<u>CSWC</u>
4	44	99	310	59	12

(c) LYON VALLEY. This 1st Marine Division operation was conducted in Base Area 112 with the mission of finding and destroying a suspected enemy regimental headquarters. It commenced on 16 August 1970 and terminated on 24 August 1970 with the following results.

<u>FRIENDLY</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>
Negative	
	<u>KIA</u> <u>IWC</u> <u>CSWC</u>
	14 7 1

(d) RIPLEY CENTER. This was a 1st Marine Division operation conducted with the mission of locating and destroying an enemy headquarters. It commenced on 13 August 1970 and terminated on 31 August 1970 with the following results.

<u>FRIENDLY</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>
<u>WIA</u>	<u>KIA</u> <u>DET</u> <u>PW</u> <u>IWC</u>
27	25 29 8 7

(e) TEXAS STAR. This 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) operation was designed to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces, caches, and base camps, and interdict enemy movement into the populated lowlands. Extensive airmobile combined operations were conducted in the area east of the A Shau Valley and west of the populated lowlands of Thua Thien Province. Reinforcements were provided for the Mai Loc Civilian Irregular Defense Group Camp. One airmobile infantry battalion was also provided as Corps reserve. Assistance was provided to Government of Vietnam forces in assuming full responsibility for combat, pacification and psychological operations in Thua Thien Province. Operations were conducted in close coordination with Territorial Forces, to include Regional Forces, Popular Forces, People's Self Defense Forces, National Police Field Forces and Provincial Reconnaissance Units. The operation commenced on 1 April 1970 and terminated on 5 September 1970 with the following results.

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<u>FRIENDLY</u>			<u>ENEMY</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IWC</u>	<u>CSWC</u>
349 US	1,774 US	8 US	2,053	25	59	420
6 ARVN	99 ARVN					181

(f) NEBRASKA RAPIDS (Initially Named ROCK CRUSHER) This operation commenced on 5 September 1970 and was designed to locate and destroy enemy forces, locate and extract caches, and disrupt enemy lines of communication. Elements of the Americal Division and 1st Marine Division conducted coordinated search and clear operations along the contiguous boundary of the 1st Marine Division/Americal Division. Additionally, United States Marine Corps and Americal Division Engineers assisted 2d ARVN Infantry Division in opening Highway 535/534 from QL 1 to Hiep Duc in preparation for a Government of Vietnam convoy. The operation terminated on 8 September 1970 with the following results.

<u>FRIENDLY</u>		<u>ENEMY</u>		
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IWC</u>
1	148	4	15	1

(g) DUPOIS SQUARE (Initially Named BALLARD VALLEY). This 1st Marine Division reconnaissance in force operation was conducted with the mission of rocket belt security and pacification of the area in the vicinity of Danang. Additional missions were to interdict enemy activity in the area of operation and interdict enemy waterway infiltration. It commenced on 10 September 1970 and terminated on 19 September 1970 with the following results.

<u>FRIENDLY</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>
<u>WIA</u>	<u>IWC</u>
1	1

(h) ELK CANYON. This Americal Division operation was conducted to secure Kham Duc Airfield and destroy or neutralize enemy forces, logistic bases, and command and control installations in the vicinity of Kham Duc. It supported the I ARVN Corps/FWMAF, Military Region 1 Combined Summer Military Campaign Plan. The operation was conducted in two phases. ELK CANYON I commenced on 12 July 1970 and terminated on 27 August 1970 with the following results.

<u>FRIENDLY*</u>		<u>ENEMY</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IWC</u>	<u>CSWC</u>
5	83	59	1	35	12

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SLK CANYON II commenced on 27 August 1970 and terminated on 19 September 1970 with the following results.

<u>FRIENDLY*</u>		<u>ENEMY</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IWC</u>	<u>CSWC</u>
33	33	39	1	19	1

*Final results have been incorporated into operation FREDERICK HILL.

(1) TOLARE FALLS. This operation was under control of the Quang Nam Province Chief and majority of the forces were Vietnamese units. It commenced on 2 October 1970 and was conducted in Dien Ban District. The operation was a combined and unilateral offensive operation consisting mainly of saturation operations with small units. It was conducted because substantial intelligence indicated that the enemy would conduct numerous attacks in Dien Ban District in an attempt to destroy the GVN pacification effort. The basic mission of this operation was to preempt these attacks and destroy the concentration of enemy forces. US forces that participated in this operation were placed under CICON of the 5th Marine Regiment 1st Marine Division. The operation terminated on 15 October 1970 with the following results.

<u>FRIENDLY</u>		<u>ENEMY</u>			
<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>DET</u>	<u>IWC</u>	<u>CSWC</u>
9 ARVN	26 US 88 ARVN	104	21	6	32

(3) The following operations are still in progress. Results to date are shown in paragraph (1) below.

(a) FREDERICK HILL. This operation is being conducted in Quang Tin Province. The operation employs elements of the 196th Infantry Brigade, Americal Division with the mission of conducting search and clear/pacification operations in coordination with Government of Vietnam forces. The Americal Division is the controlling headquarters. The operation commenced on 18 March 1969.

(b) GENEVA PARK. This operation is being conducted in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Province. The operation employs elements of the 198th Infantry Brigade, Americal Division with the mission of conducting search and clear/pacification operations in coordination with Government of Vietnam forces. The Americal Division is the controlling headquarters. The operation commenced on 18 March 1969.

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(c) IRON MOUNTAIN. This operation is being conducted in Quang Ngai Province. The operation employs elements of the 11th Infantry Brigade, Americal Division with the mission of conducting search and clear/pacification operations in coordination with Government of Vietnam forces. The Americal Division is the controlling headquarters. The operation commenced on 18 March 1969.

(d) PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE. This operation is being conducted by the Americal Division with the mission of performing search and clear and reconnaissance in force operations in the coastal plain of northeast Quang Tin Province. It commenced on 29 June 1970 and employs elements of the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry. The operation supports the I ARVN Corps/FWMAF, Military Region I, Combined Summer Military Campaign Plan.

(e) NANTUCKET BEACH. This search and clear operation is conducted jointly by the 19th Infantry Brigade, Americal Division and the 6th Infantry Regiment, 21 ARVN Infantry Division in the area between the Batangan Peninsula and Quang Nam City. The mission is to destroy Main Force/Local Force Vietnamese Communist units, and eliminate the Vietnamese Communist infrastructure and political apparatus in order to restore Government of Vietnam control of the area. The operation commenced on 26 July 1970.

(f) WOLFE MOUNTAIN. The operation is under control of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (M2 III) and consists of reconnaissance in force, saturation ambush and continuous reconnaissance operations along the Demilitarized Zone and eastern border of the Brigade's area of operation in northern Military Region I. Combined operations are conducted with Government of Vietnam forces to prevent enemy infiltration into the populated lowlands of Quang Tri Province. Additionally, a reaction force is provided for relief of the Ban Loai Communist Irregular Defense Group Camp. Forward location, with dedicated communications has been established at the district province headquarters in the Brigade area of operations. The operation commenced on 22 July 1970.

(g) IMPERIAL LAKE. This operation employs elements of the 1st Marine Division. It is a reconnaissance in force operation with the mission of locating and destroying an enemy front headquarters and capturing key enemy personnel. It commenced on 30 August 1970.

(h) JEFFERSON GLENN/MONSOON PLAN 70. This operation is conducted by the 101st Airborne Division (AMEL) in coordination with the 1st ARVN Infantry Division and Government of Vietnam officials in Thua Thien Province with the missions of locating and destroying enemy forces,

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staging areas, and forward cache sites; protecting vital lines of communication; and assisting Government of Vietnam officials in meeting their pacification goals for 1970. The operation commenced on 5 September 1970.

(i) NOBLE CANYON. This operation is conducted by the 1st Marine Division. It supports the Vietnamese HOANG DIEU Saturation operation in eastern Quang Nam Province. It employs elements of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division. The operation commenced on 22 October 1970.

(j) TOLARE FALLS II. This operation is the name of the US part of the Vietnamese HOANG DIEU Saturation operation. It is composed of Task Force Burnett, Americal Division elements, and Marine elements, which are under control of the 5th Marine Regiment. The 1st Marine Division controls all US elements which are employed in this operation.

(k) Statistical data of current operations:

NAME OF OPERATION	STARTING DATE	FRIENDLY		
		KIA	WIA	MIA
FREDERICK HILL	18 March 1969	549	3656	2
GENEVA PARK	18 March 1969	205	1539	0
IRON MOUNTAIN	18 March 1969	404	2602	0
PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE	29 June 1970	18	178	0
NANTUCKET BEACH	20 July 1970	46	561	0
WOLFE MOUNTAIN	22 July 1970	21	208	0
IMPERIAL LAKE	31 August 1970	7	94	0
JEFFERSON GLENN	5 September 1970	12	129	0
NOBLE CANYON	22 October 1970	0	9	0
TOLARE FALLS II	27 October 1970	0	0	0

NAME OF OPERATION	STARTING DATE	KIA	ENEMY				
			DET	RET	FW	WIC	CSMC
FREDERICK HILL	18 March 1969	6995	2038	96	79	1319	157
GENEVA PARK	18 March 1969	7003	1181	46	39	420	44
IRON MOUNTAIN	18 March 1969	969	2436	22	118	1002	82
PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE	29 June 1970	191	129	8	5	64	3
NANTUCKET BEACH	20 July 1970	539	474	8	22	159	5
WOLFE MOUNTAIN	22 July 1970	203	30	0	4	39	14
IMPERIAL LAKE	31 August 1970	104	77	0	0	68	3
JEFFERSON GLENN	5 September 1970	324	17	1	3	98	19
NOBLE CANYON	22 October 1970	0	1	0	0	0	0
TOLARE FALLS II	27 October 1970	4	0	0	0	0	0

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(4) Redeployment of Forces.

(a) Increment IV Redeployment. Increment IV Redeployment terminated on 15 October 1970. A total of 16 185 personnel spaces were redeployed from units under operational control of XXIV Corps during the reporting period. All spaces were United States Marine Corps elements of the III Marine Amphibious Force, 1st Marine Division, 1st Marine Air Raft Wing, Force Logistic Command, and Combined Action Force. Total Increment IV Redeployment including those redeployed before 1 August 1970, consisted of 17,021 United States Marine Corps personnel spaces and 337 United States Army personnel spaces.

(b) Increment V Redeployment. Increment V Redeployment commenced on 16 October 1970. No personnel spaces were redeployed from units under the operational control of XXIV Corps during the reporting period.

d. (U) Personnel Administration, Morale and Discipline.

(1) Civilian Personnel Management. The command is currently authorized 85 local national direct hire spaces. A loss of 18 spaces since last report.

(2) Maintenance of Unit Strength. The number of units assigned to XXIV Corps increased over the reporting period. Authorized strength is now 2,335 with 2,412 assigned.

(3) Medical.

(a) During the early part of August 1970, it became apparent that the malaria rate was rising. Subsequent investigation revealed that unit personnel were taking the Chloroquine-Primaquine pill weekly and the Dapsone pill daily. According to existing medical knowledge these medications should have maintained the rate at a much lower level. After checking further into the medications being used, it was discovered that the Dapsone being used was manufactured in 1967 or earlier. Additional tests proved that Dapsone produced in 1967 or earlier was non-effective. As of this date, no Dapsone produced in 1967 or earlier is being used.

(b) In September 1970, it was brought to the attention of the Staff Surgeon's Office that ARVN soldiers were being lost in the US hospital system. Investigation indicated that this was in fact true and that approximately 175 soldiers had been lost. There are several reasons behind this situation. The primary reason is that many ARVN patients

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arrive at the hospitals untagged, and some are in such physical condition as to be unable to supply identification. Instructions were put out to all evacuating agencies that patients must be tagged with a field medical tag. In addition, the Dustoff number and helicopter call sign of helicopters bringing patients into hospitals will be recorded in the medical records of the patient. This will allow a determination to be made of coordinates where the patients were picked up, to help in identifying patients.

(4) Provost Marshal.

(a) There was a growing number of incidents wherein Vietnamese nationals surrounded and detained US Military personnel and their vehicles after traffic accidents in which Vietnamese sustained either injury or property damage. They pressed for on-the-spot settlement of their claim for damages. This tactic appears to have been utilized by Vietnamese in order to insure prompt and expeditious settlement of their claim for damages. In an effort to reduce the number of traffic accidents, accelerate the processing of claims and restore the previously held good will of the Vietnamese people a three-pronged program was implemented.

1. Commanders were instructed to carefully review the driving records and personal habits of vehicle operators under their command insure that newly assigned drivers were carefully screened and oriented prior to issuance of operator's permits conduct refresher and remedial training as required and otherwise take prompt and aggressive action to lower the accident rate

2. Commanders were also instructed to expeditiously prepare and forward to Foreign Claims Commission reports of investigation regarding incidents involving damage to a foreign national's property.

3. As an aid to US Military Drivers and to inform Vietnamese victims of our Government's good intentions, a letter of instruction covering procedures to be followed by operators of US Government vehicles involved in accidents was prepared and given wide dissemination. This letter also prescribed a bilingual accident form to be locally reproduced and provided to all vehicle operators. The purpose of this form was to advise the Vietnamese of the fact that the accident would be reported to and investigated by Military Police and that they may submit a claim for injuries and damages at the address indicated on the form.

4. In addition, numerous meetings have been held with Civil

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Operations for Rural Development Support Public Safety Division personnel, MACV Advisors, and Vietnamese civil and Military Officials in an attempt to obtain the cooperation of Vietnamese National Police, who have authority over the Vietnamese civilians involved in these incidents. Such attempts have met with limited success due to the political pressures existing in Military Region 1.

(b) With the stand down of US Marine Corps Military Police units, the need for US Army Military Police as replacements arose. The 504th Military Police Battalion resources in Military Region 1 at the time were inadequate to handle these requirements and a request for assignment of an additional Military Police Company was submitted to USARV. The 188th Military Police Company was relocated from Military Region 4 to Danang and assumed the mission of supporting the Danang Sector Combined Police Operation in August. In addition, the 504th Military Police Battalion assumed Provost Marshal operational responsibilities for Danang Sector from XXIV Corps at the same time.

(c) The 18th Military Police Brigade assumed operation of the former III Marine Amphibious Force Frig on 10 April 1970 and redesignated it USARV Installation Stockade, Danang. This confinement facility houses prisoners in pretrial confinement from Military Regions 1 and 2.

(d) In view of the rapid buildup of US Army Military resources in Military Region 1, particularly in Danang, the 16th Military Police Group displaced from Nha Trang to Danang in September 1970.

(e) Several fact-finding teams interested in the status of drug abuse in the Republic of Vietnam visited Military Region 1 and were escorted by members of XXIV Corps Provost Marshal's Office. Of particular interest was the recently instituted Amnesty Program for drug users. However, due to the "newness" of the program, any attempt to rate the degree of success or failure of this program was considered premature.

(f) A Military Payment Certificate Conversion was made during this reporting period. Instructions to law enforcement agencies regarding their C-Day responsibilities had been recently published and conversion was effected with no major police problems.

(g) Military Justice. The 7th Psychological Operations Bn and 138th Liaison Company (Airmobile, Fixed Wing) (Radio Research) were attached to XXIV Corps for administration of Military Justice, effective 1 October 1970.

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e. (C) Logistics.

(1) (U) General. During the reporting period the logistical posture throughout the Corps AO remained in a high state of readiness and was responsive to all demands.

(2) (C) Operations.

(a) Common Service Support. With the phasing out of the Naval Support Activity, Danang, the Army assumed the responsibility for all Common Service Support in Military Region 1.

(b) Real Estate. During the reporting period the following bases were transferred to the ARVN. The total number of structures involved was 801 for a credit return to the US of over \$1,218,820, in acquisition values:

- 1 Landing Zone Bayonet II.
- 2 Namu Bridge.
- 3 Hai Van Pass.
- 4 Sparrow Neb.
- 5 Camp Hoover.
- 6 An Hoa Combat Base.
- 7 Ninth Engineer Compound. Danang.
- 8 Dai La Pass.
- 9 Landing Zone Artillery Hill.
- 10 Hue LCU Ramp.

f. (U) Inspector General. None.

g. (U) Information. None.

h. (U) Command History. None.

i. (U) Aviation. None.

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j. (C) Signal.

(1) (C) Communications Support for Quang Da Special Zone. During the reporting period one additional CU/TTY circuit was activated from the Danang East Primary Relay Station to support Quang Da Special Zone.

(2) (C) 108th Artillery Group Headquarters relocation. During the first part of October the 108th Artillery Group relocated to Phu Bai Combat Base. This relocation required the reroute and retermination of 108th Artillery Group voice and teletype circuits. Additional voice circuits were activated between the 108th Artillery Group and 8th Battalion, 4th Artillery.

(3) (U) Phase down and relocation 5th Communication Battalion. The 5th Communication Battalion (USMC) was phased down to a communications support company and relocated to Danang North. The 27th Signal Battalion assumed responsibility for maintaining cable installations at Danang East previously assigned to the 5th Communications Battalion.

(4) (U) Relocation of Headquarters, USA Support Command. USA Support Command relocated to the old Naval Support Activity Hospital area. This relocation required reroute and retermination of required circuits.

(5) (C) AUTOSEVOCOM. An AUTOSEVOCOM circuit request was submitted to support Company C, 5th Special Forces Group, off of SECORD 81 at Monkey Mountain. On 17 September 1970 it was found that circuit could not be activated due to lack of line conditioning equipment, therefore on 18 September 1970 another circuit request was submitted to reroute the circuit to SECORD 51/71 Danang. On 28 September 1970 Company C, 5th Special Forces Group advised that the circuit was not required because the unit was departing Danang. Cancellation for circuit was submitted on 29 September 1970.

(6) (U) Zone Coordinator. XXIV Corps was made Coordinator for the installation of circuits over US Component service cable installations within the Danang area by USARV message 230504Z September 1970 (C).

(7) (U) Cable Outages.

(a) The 518 cable which runs between the Danang Air Force Dial Central Office to Danang East Dial Telephone Exchange is out of order because of small arms fire and poor splicing which was done in the past.

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During the recent heavy rains the cable pairs have become wet and shorted out. Work is under way to dry the cable out and repair the splice properly.

(b) During the period 29 September 1970 through 9 October 1970 the 439L undersea cable that connects Danang with Qui Nhon was out. This created a large amount of circuit outages to include land telephone circuits. MINIMIZE was put into effect. The problem was alleviated by altrouting circuits over existing Tropospheric Radio Systems until the cable was restored. The Defense Communications Agency is improving its OPLAN for restoration of circuits if the cable should ever be cut again.

(8) (U) AFVN Rebroadcast at Phu Bai Camp Eagle areas. Action was taken to install AFVN rebroadcast stations at Phu Bai and Camp Eagle. This action was taken as an interim measure until studies could be conducted regarding the possible relocation of the Quang Tri AFVN Station to Hue.

(9) (U) Systems Reconfigurations. During the reporting period three Corps area communication systems were deactivated. One Defense Communications microwave system between Danang In-Country System and Danang East Navy site was deactivated on 10 October 1970. Deactivations included:

- (a) 12 Channel System Phu Bai to Hue MACV.
- (b) 12 Channel System Phu Bai to Gia Le.
- (c) 21 Channel System Phu Bai to Danang.
- (d) 12 Channel System Danang AF to Danang East Navy Site.

(10) (U) Circuit Activations/Deactivations/Reterrminations. A total of 10 circuits were activated, 11 circuits deactivated, and 13 circuits rerouted or reterminated. All Defense Communications System and Corps Area Communications Sole User Voice/TFN circuits were reported to USARV in chart form. All sole user circuits that serve Headquarters XXIV Corps were reviewed and reported to MACV.

(11) (C) FM Frequency Assignment. A complete new frequency assignment plan went into effect on 15 October 1970. The management program, after a loss of 117 FM Frequencies to MACV for ARVN, had to be adjusted and assignments made under a most austere condition. As a result the program has to be rigid and well managed especially in the area north of

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the Hai Van Pass and South of Hoi An.

(12) (C) NESTOR. Recent arrival of modification kits for UH-1D aircraft has enabled the program to progress. An area of special interest is the equipping of all Dustoff aircraft with secure equipment. Presently, the 67th Medical Group Dustoff aircraft are being scheduled for modification and crypto accounts to draw the secure equipment are being established.

(13) (U) Air Courier. As the 12th Signal Group moved from Phu Bai to Danang, a revised courier plan was placed into effect utilizing aircraft from the 12th Signal Group and 62d Aviation Company, providing for better service and utilization of aircraft assets.

K (U) Engineers

(1) Organization

(a) During this quarter the 8th and the 7th (less one company) Force Engineer Battalions (FEB) redeployed. The 18th Mobile Construction Battalion and the 501st Mobile Construction Battalion Utilities (USN) were also redeployed.

(b) The initial portion (B Co reinforced) of the 8th Engineer Construction Battalion arrived in Danang, and is preparing facilities for the remainder of the battalion to occupy. The 84th Construction Battalion should be operational about 1 December 1970.

(c) The ARVN 18th Land Clearing Company is being equipped out of assets from the 18th Engineer Brigade and will be operational in the near future. The USMC Land Clearing Battalion was among the units retrograded during the quarter.

(2) Combat Support Operations

(a) Mine Clearing. There were 1037 mining and booby trap incidents in Military Region I during this quarter. 542 of these were detected and caused no damage. There were 495 that were accidentally detonated, causing 124 Allied personnel to be killed and 638 wounded, 12 major pieces of equipment destroyed and 67 pieces damaged. These figures represent a 52.3 percent find ratio.

(b) Non-divisional US engineer units were sweeping a daily average of 135 km of road for mines at the end of this quarter.

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(3) Significant Construction Projects.

(a) Advisor Well Program During the 1st Quarter Fiscal Year 1971, action has been taken at XXIV Corps to assemble a packaged program to assure a satisfactory water source for each outlying MACV Advisor site in Military Region 1. A qualified geologic engineering team inspected 25 proposed sites late in the quarter and will submit a report which will provide the basis for a total water well program, complete with drilling machinery and installed equipment. When completed, the program will be submitted to USARV for submission for funding and scheduling.

(b) Piedmont Airfields Considerable progress has been realized on a combined program, initiated in Fiscal Year 1970, to upgrade a series of piedmont airfields in Quang Ngai Province. XXIV Corps has coordinated the upgrading of airfields at Tra Bong, Ha Thanh and Ha To. The on-site work is being done by US Navy Sea Bees using steel matting provided by ARVN, with logistical support provided by the Americal Division and the US Air Force. Tra Bong and Ha Thanh were completed during the current quarter and Ha To is to be complete early in the next quarter.

(4) Facilities Engineering The great reduction in facilities engineering operations funds for Fiscal Year 1971 as compared with Fiscal Year 1970 has had an effect on the availability of engineer troops to perform operational support missions. Some projects that would likely have been done by contractor have been tasked to troop units, i.e., dog kennels, a class I storage facility, and improvement of a hospital area. Outbacks in contractor provided services have to be taken up "self help." These "self help" projects, if beyond simple housekeeping maintenance, require engineer skills and equipment and cause the diversion of engineering troop effort. An example being the maintenance of roads on base camps at a time when the monsoon rains made the maintenance of tactical roads extremely difficult. This diversion of troop effort can be expected to increase in the next quarter.

(5) Road Construction and Maintenance

(a) The remaining 40 km of QL-1 in Military Region 1 was paved. This completes QL-1 in Military Region 1 with the exception of approximately 2 km through Quang Ngai City which has been contracted to the Root, Morrison and Knudson Construction agency. Also completed during this quarter were the roads to Fire Support Bases Barbara, Rakasan, Arsenal and the first phase of provincial highway 524/523. New projects started during this quarter were the upgrading and paving of

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ML 13C/12E, upgrading of HL 524/523 (second phase) and the start and completion of HL 525 and Mai Lo Rd. Work continued throughout the quarter on LTL 4 (which is now being paved), HL 521, HL 522, HL 533, Fire Support Base T-Bone Access Road and upgrading and maintenance of HL 547. The Quang Tri Bridge was completed and the Song Ve Bridge opened for traffic with pier protection remaining to be completed.

(b) During this quarter ARVN engineer forces continued work on HL 529, HL 535, the Gia Dang Road, and they started work on HL 601 (the Hai Lang Road) and HL 597B (the Street without Joy).

(c) Sixty-nine kilometers of tactical roads were completed and the upgrading of 91 kilometers of tactical road was started, while construction continues on 216 kilometers.

(d) During the latter third of this quarter, as was anticipated, with the beginning of the monsoon season in Military Region I, it has become necessary to devote an ever increasing amount of engineering effort to road maintenance. Additional effort is required to keep the primary lines of communication and tactical roads open as a result of the destructive effects of the monsoon. The increased maintenance responsibilities brought about by the monsoon and the redeployment of engineer troops and their essential equipment and facilities has revealed the following:

1. Lack of post crashdown capability by engineer units with only TOE equipment and the lack of funds to support engineer projects with funds to purchase sufficient Rock, Morrison and Knudson contractor produced rock.

2. Lack of responsive facilities engineer support due to cut back in funds.

(e) Land Clearing. Land clearing was conducted in five different areas of Military Region I. Two Provisional Clearing Platoons and one Land Clearing Company cleared a total of 23,921 acres of land. There were 1053 pieces of ordnance ranging from hand grenades to 500 pound bombs, found and destroyed. One hundred fifteen booby traps were reported found and destroyed. Many other booby traps were hit by the equipment causing some damage. Found and destroyed in the 23,921 acres that were cleared were: 1013 bunkers, 916 fighting holes, 6400 meters of trenches, 4068 meters of tunnels, 19 huts and 63 acres of gardens. Over 4000 pounds of food and other miscellaneous items including tools,

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clothing, medical supplies, 49 pigs, 2 cows, and 25 chickens were captured. These losses were inflicted on the enemy at a price of 23 US KIA, 2 dozers destroyed, 3 dozers heavily damaged and 9 dozers lightly damaged.

(7) Flooding.

(a) From 27 October 1970 through 31 October 1970, intense monsoon rains caused severe flooding throughout Military Region I. Rainfall in the mountain regions is estimated to have been two to three times that of the coastal lowlands. Data gathered from gaging stations in the coastal plains for rainfall in Military Region I from 27 October 1970 through 31 October 1970 is as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>7 STATION AVERAGE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MAX STATION RECORD</u>
27 October 1970	2.15 in	Camp Evans	4.55 in
28 October 1970	1.38 in	Camp Eagle	2.14 in
29 October 1970	4.27 in	Camp Evans	5.32 in
30 October 1970	7.04 in	Quang Tri	11.32 in
31 October 1970	3.21 in	Camp Evans	7.54 in

(b) The roads in Military Region I remained open through 29 October 1970. By 0700, 30 October 1970 QL-1 was under water in many places. The Hai Van Pass on QL-1 was closed by rock and mud slides. All tactical and secondary roads were closed due to high water and washouts. Parts of Quang Ngai City were under 15 feet of water. The rain continued and the water rose until QL-1 was under more than six feet of water in places, and completely under water for sections of up to 15 km of roadway. A large volume of water continued to flow over QL-1 until 3 November 1970, and portions of tactical roads remained under water until 5 November 1970.

(c) Two bridges on QL-1 were completely washed out. The most frequent damages were undermined and washed out bridge abutments and approaches. Twelve bridges had one or both abutments of approaches washed out, and several bridges suffered from cracked, broken or washed out piles. Numerous culverts were washed out and large sections of the road surface were eroded. The problem requiring the most extensive repair effort is that caused by shoulder erosion along QL-1 which in some places extended to a depth of six feet below the normal ground level and up to half way across the road. Numerous other bridges and culverts were washed out on the tactical and secondary roads.

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(d) QL-1 was opened to traffic on 3 November 1970 as the waters receded. With a few minor exceptions all the tactical and lesser roads were open by 6 November 1970.

(e) The quick reopening of QL-1 and the tactical roads were a result of the quick response and coordination which took place between all engineer units in Military Region 1. US and ARVN units employed tactical bridging, refilled gaps, and repaired damage almost as it occurred. These emergency measures minimized the disruption to essential military traffic; however, a major construction effort will be required to return the major lines of communication to their previous condition.

1. (U) Civic Action, Psychological Operations.

(1) Civic Action

(a) Military Civic Action: The summary of military Civic Action accomplishments by US military forces in Military Region 1 for the reporting period is as follows: A total of 21,663 man days, based on a 10-hour day, were expended in support of military Civic Action. Total monetary expenditures were VN\$16,641,208 (VN\$11,096,811 from military resources, VN\$1,077,631 from Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations Assistance in kind fund, 1,466,766 from military contributions). The average percentage of each project completed using self-help labor was 75, and 18 percent of the materials furnished were from Vietnamese resources. A breakdown of the civic action effort follows:

Program	Man Days	VNS
Economic Development	1,766	840.15
Education	2,579	1,544.441
Social Welfare	1,802	5,214.513
Transportation	1,600	1,834.81
Refugee Support	1,183	677.50
Others	3,733	1,925.23
Total	12,663	13,056.724

Institutions assisted during the reporting period included 1125 schools, 156 orphanages, 113 hospitals/clinics, and 200 others.

(b) Medical Civic Action Program: A total of 159,012 persons were treated by Medical Civic Action Program personnel; 575 of these resulted from hostile action. Additionally 4791 persons received dental treatment. A total of 2741 immunizations were administered: 491 plague,

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477 cholera, 394 smallpox and 1372 miscellaneous injections. Five hundred sixty four Vietnamese health workers were trained in first aid and nursing techniques in conjunction with the Medical Civic Action Program. Three hundred seventy three personal hygiene/sanitation classes were taught with 3158 persons attending.

(c) At 1600H 15 October 1970, the G5 established and supervised the XXIV Corps Disaster Relief Coordination Center (DRCC) in accordance with XXIV Corps OFLAN 170-70 (Typhoon/Tropical Storm Contingency Plan), in order to prepare for Typhoon Jean. Actions and tasks were established for G2, G3 and G4 representatives of the DRCC. Warning conditions were passed as appropriate. Complete times for condition tasks accomplished by subordinate units were logged. Weather bulletins received from the Corps weather officer were provided to all agencies requesting storm status. All military and civilian personnel were kept informed through the DRCC's coordination with ARVN, Radio Da Nang, and Vietnam Information Service and through Civil Operations for Rural Development Support. Condition II (highest warning received) was lifted at 1200H 16 October 1970. The DRCC remained operational for an additional 24 hours. Subordinate units were instructed to bring any disaster relief problems occurring after this time to the attention of the XXIV Corps G5. No further problems were reported.

(d) The XXIV Corps Disaster Relief Coordination Center was again activated at 2030H 23 October 1970 in preparation for Typhoon Kate. The DRCC passed storm condition warnings and was prepared to coordinate assistance for military and civilian personnel in Military Region I. A major contributing factor to the smooth coordination was experience gained from Typhoon Jean during the week of 12 October 1970. Early warning and timely preparation by subordinate units minimized damage. There were no serious injuries nor major equipment losses reported.

(e) The XXIV Corps Disaster Relief Coordination Center was activated at 1520H 29 October 1970 for flooding conditions in Military Region I. For the third time during the period the DRCC passed storm condition warnings and coordinated assistance for military and civilian personnel in Military Region I. Actions and tasks were established for G2, G3, G4, and Naval Support representatives of the DRCC.

(2) Psychological Operations.

(a) XXIV Corps published a letter (AVII-GE) subject: Chieu Hoi Ministry Monetary Rewards, dated 4 August 1970, explaining the Republic of Vietnam Chieu Hoi Ministry Publication #211 13 July 1970. The

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publication deals with research for weapons, ammunition, military supplies, and war equipment. This matter is intended to improve US military psychological operations in support of the Government of Vietnam Chieu Hoi Program.

(b) The Military Region 1 Psychological Operations Section presently publishes a monthly bulletin between the 15th and 20th of each month. The publication is designed to improve communications between regional and supporting JROF agencies. Problem areas in the development, production and distribution of quality PSYOP material, as well as the dissemination of information, are discussed. Military Region 1 publications are reviewed for publication in other publications outdated and counterproductive information should no longer be used. Questions and comments from the JROF community are accepted and have wide-scale application are forwarded to the JROF.

[illegible]

(d) During the period, 22-24 September 1970, the ARVN Political Operations staff members at Headquarters, Joint Military Region I, Political Warfare staff members of I AMTC, and members of the Republic of China and major ARVN and US units in Military Region I. The purpose of the visit was to familiarize members of the ARVN Political Warfare Force and ARVN Corps Headquarters with US Civil Military Operations in Military Region I and to provide guidance concerning military coordination and psychological Operations activities. Included in the visit were two Republic of China Political Warfare Advisors.

(e) The Military Region 2 Combined Psychological Operations Center (CPOC) was consolidated at the location on 15 October 1970. This

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consolidation placed all CPOC sections, with the exception of Air Section at Danang Air Base, in the same compound with the 7th Psychological Operations Battalion and the 10th ARVN Political Warfare Battalion. This consolidation has improved efficiency and increased the coordination in Psychological Operations.

(f) A summary of the Psychological Operations production and dissemination for Military Region I assets is as follows:

New leaflets requested	223*
New leaflets produced	209*
Magnetic broadcast tapes requested	119
Magnetic broadcast tapes produced	119
Reprints of printed material requested	215*
Reprints of printed material produced	185*
Total amount of new printed (leaflet equivalents)	45,671,500*
Total amount of reprints (leaflet equivalents)	26,519,000*
Leaflet targets scheduled	10,532*
Leaflet targets flown	7296**
Aerial broadcast targets scheduled	9680
Aerial broadcast targets flown	5168*

* The difference between the printed media requested and that actually printed resulted from the use of items already in stock or the substitution of a very similar item already on hand.

** The difference between the targets scheduled and the targets flown resulted in targets not being flown due to adverse weather conditions.

m. (C) Corps Artillery.

(1) Organization.

(a) During the month of August 1970 two units of the 11th Marines stood down. These were the 1st 8" Howitzer Battery which completed stand down on 18 August 1970 (6 x 8" Howitzers) and the 3d 175 Gun Battery which stood down on 27 August 1970.

(b) On 27 August 1970 4 x 160mm towed howitzers that had been attached to the 173d Airborne Brigade were transferred to the 2d Bn, 320th Artillery of the 101st Airborne Division.

(c) On 12 September 1970 18 x 160mm towed howitzers in direct support of the 14th Vietnamese Marine Corps Brigade moved with the Brigade to Quang Tri Province from Quang Nam Province.

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(d) The 2d ROK Marine Corps Brigade returned 6 x LVTH-6's (Landing Vehicle Tracked Howitzer) on 14 September 1970 and received 6 x 105mm towed howitzers on loan from III MAF on 15 September 1970.

(e) On 16 September 1970 the 2d Bn, 94th Artillery began its move to Quang Nam Province with the relocation of Battery C. Battery A followed on 25 September and Battery B followed on 15 October 1970. The mission of the 2d Bn, 94th Artillery with its 6 x 105mm guns and 6 x 8" howitzers is now General Support Headquarters to Quang Da Special Zone Artillery. In addition to answering calls for fire from XXIV Corps Artillery Headquarters, the Battalion will answer calls from the 1st Marine Regiment.

(f) Also during September the 1st Battalion received three additional units. The first was Battery M, 1st Marine Regiment (18 x 105mm towed) which stood down on 15 September 1970. On 25 September 1970 Battery M, 1st Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division (18 x 105mm towed) stood down. Finally, on 15 September 1970 Battery N, 1st Marine Regiment (18 x 105mm towed) stood down.

(g) During the 1st week of October 1970, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 109th Artillery moved from Dong Ha to Phu Bai. The 109th Artillery moved from Dong Ha to Phu Bai during the 1st week of October 1970.

(h) Personnel Changes:

1. On 2 September 1970, Brigadier General Joseph T. Lippert assumed command from Brigadier General Robert L. Hixon.

2. On 5 September 1970, Colonel Bruce H. Lippert assumed command as Deputy Commander, XXIV Corps Artillery.

3. On 16 September 1970, Lt Colonel Joseph T. Lippert assumed command as Executive Officer, XXIV Corps Artillery.

(i) Substantial losses of company grade officers, with no replacements, seriously threatened the combat effectiveness of XXIV Corps Artillery. As late as 30 September 1970, XXIV Corps Artillery and its subordinate units were short 7 of 62 authorized Field Artillery Captains, and 34 of 73 authorized Field Artillery Lieutenants. The impact of these critical shortages was somewhat allayed by assignment of eight Air Defense Artillery Captains and 21 Air Defense Artillery Lieutenants against Field Artillery vacancies. An aggressive program to insure that USAFV Assignments Branch was aware of our critical needs

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reduced these shortages to 18 Captains and 18 Lieutenants by 31 October 1970. Eight Captains and 21 Lieutenant Air Defense Officers continued to fill Field Artillery vacancies on 31 October 1970.

(2) Significant Activities

(a) Support for Operations TEXAS STAR and JEFFERSON GLEN. Corps Artillery supported operations of the 1st Airborne Division (AMBL) and the 1st ARVN Infantry Division from Gia Le (YD 829151), Fire Support Bases Birmingham (YD 706102), Bastogne (YD 620095), Veghel (YD 550035), Jack (YD 495287), Barbara (YD 442394), Nancy (YD 442394) and Landing Zone Sally (YD 438274).

(b) Support for WOLF's MOUNTAIN. Corps Artillery units supported operations of the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (MECH) and the 1st ARVN Division from Fire Support Bases A.L. (YD 118031), C-1 (YD 213674), C-2 (YD 135045), Wadsworth (YD 442394), Nancy (YD 442394), Barbara (YD 442394) and Camp Carroll (YD 442394).

(c) Support for operations in Quang Tri Special Zone. Corps Artillery units supported the 1st Airborne Division and the Quang Tri Special Zone from Fire Support Bases Bastogne (YD 620095), MAC (YD 921785) and Combat Base Ross (BT 7000).

(d) Artillery Air Support of Operations. Corps Artillery conducted only two artillery missions during the last quarter. Two moves of short duration were executed to provide heavy artillery support for specific maneuver operations. This reflects a significant decrease of these types of missions from the last quarter.

UNIT	TUBES	FROM	TO	INCLUSIVE DATES
B/8-4	4 x 175	C-1	Wadsworth	22 October 1970 (RAID)
B/1-83	2 x 8"	Birmingham	Bastogne	23 October 1970
A/1-83	2 x 175	Bastogne	Birmingham	23 October 1970
B/1-83	2 x 8"	Bastogne	Birmingham	26 October 1970
A/1-83	2 x 175	Birmingham	Bastogne	26 October 1970
C/2-94	2 x 8"	Jack	Jack	29 October 1970 (RAID)

(e) The 1st Battalion, 4th Artillery (AW) (SF), employed a new concept of the Duster raid by deploying two M161 Dusters supported by security elements into positions southwest of Fire Support Base 411. The raid took place on 24 August 1970 and lasted for approximately 4 hours after which the weapons returned to Fire Support Base 411.

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(f) On 13 September 1970 at the request of the 101st Airborne Division Artillery, a searchlight and quad 50 cal machine gun were emplaced on a barge in the LCS BANOS basin to cover nighttime activity along a portion of the railroad. This reflects the first attempt at maintaining a coordinated firing system (a Portatile for sensor readouts, searchlight, and machine guns) on a floating platform.

(g) On 9 October 1970 two Dusters from the 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery (AW) (SP), moved from Combat Base Baldy to support a Combined Unit Pacification Program team operation in the southern Que Son mountains. The action was well coordinated and reflects the first use of M42A1 Dusters to support by fire joint Duster and infantry operations.

(h) During the reporting period the change in policy on ammunition expenditures resulted in significant expenditure reduction by all calibers of artillery. Expenditures continued to decrease as artillery commanders continued to monitor the selection and engagement of targets. By October 1970, expenditures had reached a low point and it was realized that many targets appropriate for artillery engagement were engaged by other means or not attacked at all. Recent efforts to gather, study, and coordinate all targeting activities have resulted in increased heavy artillery expenditures. This trend is expected to level off as sound targeting by fire support coordinators at all levels continues to improve intelligence gathering and subsequent selection of attack criteria.

(i) Battle Damage Assessment Battle Damage Assessment for Military Region 1 US Artillery units during the reporting period was as follows:

TARGET DESCRIPTION	NUMBER
Bunkers Destroyed	255
Bunkers Damaged	151
Structures Destroyed	137
Structures Damaged	62
Anti-Aircraft Positions Destroyed	8
Killed by Artillery (Confirmed)	367
Killed by Artillery (Unconfirmed)	18
Secondary Explosions	101
Secondary Fires	6
Meters Trench Destroyed	125
Rocket Positions Destroyed	4
Sampans Destroyed	4
Sampans Damaged	3
Bridges Destroyed	2

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(j) Naval Gunfire.

1 During this period nine US Navy ships, two Royal Australian Navy ships, and two Coast Guard cutters provided Naval Gunfire support to ground units in Military Region 1. About 75 percent of this support was provided by a destroyer firing 2-5"/54 caliber, rapid-fire guns in the southeastern portion of the Demilitarized Zone in support of 1st ARVN Division (FWD) and 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (MECH). The USS Saint Paul brought her 9-8" guns to bear on the enemy during a three-week period for the last time before returning to CONUS for decommissioning. The two cutters were extra assets borrowed from the coastal surveillance force for short periods of time. Other units utilizing Naval Gunfire support were Americal Division, 2d ROKMC Brigade, and 1st Marine Division.

2 Due to the pacification successes, a decrease in Naval Gunfire support ship assets, deteriorating weather conditions, and unavailability of some ammo types the total number of missions and rounds expended has been cut 35 percent from that of the previous reporting period. The team at 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (MECH) Fire Support Coordination Center was consolidated with the team at 1st ARVN Division (FWD), but regular liaison is still being maintained from Long Ha. All support in northern Military Region 1 is in the southeastern portion of the Demilitarized Zone in support of the 1st ARVN Division, and with the institution of a Fire Support Coordination Center at 1st ARVN Division (FWD) Naval Gunfire support of the 1st ARVN Division is expected to predominate in the future. The Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company maintained liaison/spot teams at XXIV Corps Headquarters in Da Nang, at Americal Division Headquarters and at A 1 A 2 C 1, and 1st ARVN Division (FWD) Headquarters.

3 During the reporting period there were 2652 missions fired in Military Region 1 and 11 713 rounds expended resulting in the following damage assessment:

<u>TARGET DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
KIA (Confirmed)	12
KIA (Probable)	20
Secondary Explosions	46
Bunkers Destroyed	30
Bunkers Damaged	30

(k) Friendly Fire Incidents. The following fire incidents were

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reported in Military Region 1 during the period 1 August - 31 October 1970:

1 Number of incidents and accidents.

	<u>Artillery</u>	<u>Mortar</u>	<u>Aerial Field Artillery</u>	<u>Naval Gunfire</u>
August	3	2	1	0
September	5	1	1	0
October	1	1	0	0

2 Casualties.

	<u>US</u>		<u>OTHER</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>	
	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Wounded</u>	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Wounded</u>	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Wounded</u>
August	2	1	2	11	10	17
September	0	1	1	10	7	18
October	1	1	1	1	2	5

(1) Firing Battery Inspection Team. During the reporting period the Corps Artillery Firing Battery Inspection Team was discontinued due to a lack of personnel. Accidents and problems have enabled the team to be reformed and inspection will be conducted shortly within the Corps Artillery. During the period of the fire direction procedures, firing battery operations, and the use of safety will be made in each battery. Upon the conclusion of any other within Corps Artillery attention will be turned to Artillery Battalion, 1st Division with emphasis being placed on technical assistance rather than inspection.

(m) Meteorological Quality Control Team. The following is a listing, by month, of the number of balloons checked during the quarter and the results obtained:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>NUMBER OF SOUNDINGS</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
	<u>Checked</u>	<u>Unsatisfactory</u>	<u>Unsatisfactory</u>
August	13	4	30.6
September	14	6	42.5
October	12	0	0.0

(n) Excess and/or Unneeded Equipment. Increased emphasis was placed on the identification, classification and disposition of excess and/or unneeded equipment throughout the XXIV Corps Artillery units. During the period assets totalling \$11,000 were determined to be excess and/or unneeded and were turned in through appropriate supply channels.

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(o) Communications.

1 During the period 1 August to 31 October 1970, the XXIV Corps Artillery Command Fire FM Net was expanded with the addition of 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery (AW)(SP), and 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery into the net. This net offered a secure means of communication with those units that did not have access to the AUTOSYNCOM telephone system, and served as a back up for those units that did have this capability.

2 The establishment of an FM retransmission station at Hai Van Pass enabled XXIV Corps Artillery Headquarters to have extended communications north and south to subordinate units and with aircraft operating in Military Region 1.

3 Late in July 1970 there were two conferences held with XXIV Corps, XXIV Corps Artillery, 1st Marine Division, 20th Signal Company, 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery (AW)(SP), and ARVN personnel concerning ARVN control of Hai Van Pass after the Marine unit was to withdraw. It was determined that for security purposes it would be necessary to move the retransmission stations operated by 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery (AW)(SP) and XXIV Corps Artillery personnel. After making communications tests this move was successfully completed.

4 Several incidents of unintentional jamming were noted throughout the period concerned. Due to the restriction in the number of frequencies allocated in Military Region 1, units have used frequencies that they were not authorized, causing temporary communications disruptions and interference. Emphasis has been placed by all units to use only authorized frequencies and call signs and the results have shown a positive decline in interference reports.

5 Emphasis was placed on using XXIV Corps Artillery Secure Radioteletype Net for passing administrative traffic, artillery Sitreps, Intsums, sightings by Integrated Observation Devices, and intelligence targets. This communications system provided a fast secure means of passing traffic, and was a sound means of backup communications.

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations:

- a. (U) Personnel. None.
- b. (C) Intelligence/Counterintelligence.

3.

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(1) Specialized Interrogation

(a) Observation: XXIV Corps Interrogation of Prisoners of War Branch assigned one interrogator the function of conducting interrogations of all detainees from transportation units in Military Region 1. To prepare himself for this specialized function, the interrogator conducted several studies on the operational area, mission, and methods used by various transportation units.

(b) Evaluation: This technique provided the interrogator with a thorough knowledge in the operational area of enemy activity, enabling him to interrogate more intelligently and to apply in this field.

(c) Recommendation: That units in this region where specialized interrogation is indicated should be assigned for collection emphasis on specific units, types of units, and support, artillery, reconnaissance, etc.

(2) Daily Intelligence Briefing

(a) Observation: AII Corps has a daily update briefing for the AICOF, G-2 in which representatives of the G-2 Branch and the 22nd Military Intelligence Group present the most recent and significant items of information and intelligence summary of significant events for that day to the group. This briefing was completed and findings required.

(b) Evaluation: The AII Corps Briefing results in a coordination of pertinent information from all the divisions of G-2 and related agencies. Because all the divisions as well as the 22nd Military Intelligence Group are represented, there is an increase in coordination of intelligence and cooperation. Further, the AII Corps Briefing has proven to be a good training and training period for briefers and chiefs to be presented to the General Staff.

(c) Recommendation: That headquarters are having a large number of intelligence agencies which must work in coordination consider using a similar briefing or conference.

(3) Remote Firing Device Ambush

(a) Observation: Commander Task Unit 221.14 at Hoi An has had success utilizing remote firing devices in conjunction with sensor

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strings for mechanical ambushes. Claymore mines were placed to make a kill zone. The claymores would be detonated when sensors indicated movement in the kill zone.

(b) Evaluation: Two successful ambushes resulted in positive kill assessment with reduced hazard to friendly unit. Three failures can be attributed to erroneous technical information concerning the types of batteries to be used in remote firing device equipment. The battery type was corrected by COMUSMACV message 241027Z October 1970 (C).

(c) Recommendation: New remote firing device equipment is to be issued in the near future. Recommended this equipment and earlier model equipment be considered for further use in exploiting this ambush technique.

1. (U) Operations.

(1) Review of Contingency Plans.

(a) Observations: Contingency plans for 1 October 1970, Typhoons Joan and Kate enhanced the contingency plan. It was found that appropriate contingency plans were created and revised as needed and that responsible personnel were informed of all changes to the plan.

(b) Evaluation: The appropriate contingency plan is generally in October - November and is revised at the beginning of the north-east monsoon season in January. The changeover creates a loss of expertise in all contingencies. Since these storms are seasonal, it is essential that all personnel become familiar with the appropriate plan prior to the season. Plans should also be reviewed, prior to the storm season, to insure that they are correct and all procedures are up to date.

(c) Recommendation: The all commanders and staff officers institute programs to insure that all personnel are familiar with seasonal contingency plans as well as all contingency plans, and that a continuous contingency plan review is in effect. This is especially important in short tour areas such as Vietnam.

1. (U) Organization. None.

e. (U) Training.

(1) Unit Employment Procedures for the Mechanical Ambush.

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(a) Observation: Recent field experience with Mechanical Ambushes reveals that faulty procedures and carelessness on the part of emplacement and recovery personnel is reflected in all events causing injury and death to friendly personnel.

(b) Evaluation: Recent field experience has produced significant results in terms of enemy kill, warning of rapid enemy movement and early warning for friendly personnel. However, the Mechanical Ambush is a dangerous weapon. Careful training and care must be given for emplacement and recovery. These individuals must be trained in correct procedures until proficient. Accidents involving Mechanical Ambushes must be reported and personnel within the area must be trained on Mechanical Ambush locations.

(c) Recommendation: The following recommendations, analysis and SOIs to establish procedures for the use of Mechanical Ambushes, emplacement and recovery procedures, and the reporting and briefing of individuals on Mechanical Ambushes must be followed. Only those inflicted on the enemy should be reported. All emplacement procedures for the Mechanical Ambush must be followed by XXIV Corps on 31 September 1970.

(d) Enemy Mine Technique

(a) Observation: The enemy employed a technique of employing a mine to escape a mine. In August 1970, this technique was responsible for the death of 28 friendly personnel and the wounding of 28 others and the destruction of 10 friendly vehicles.

(b) Evaluation: This technique employed a mine to escape a mine to prevent mechanical detection of the mine. This was accomplished by removing base rocks from the shoulder of the road directly above the mine, then digging an arched hole in the road bed directly under the edge of the road. Once the mine was emplaced, the soil was replaced and the hole was carefully resealed to conceal any disturbance. Liquid asphalt was poured over the hole, but was spread to conceal the fresh asphalt and finally the area was rolled with a tire to give the entire shoulder a uniform appearance. The mine was concealed by the rocks and asphalt on the road shoulder and by dense vegetation for a distance of 20 meters off the road. The mine was command detonated from a point 100 meters from the road. Considerable effort was exerted by the enemy in emplacing this mine. Based on this

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success, it can be expected that this technique will be used on QL-1 and other hard surface roads in Military Region 1.

(d) Recommendations: That this technique of mine employment be disseminated within all units. That mine sweep teams be trained in the proper method of detecting a mine above a metal culvert by adjusting the sensitivity of the detector until the culvert is no longer picked up and then sweeping over the culvert. By using this method, metallic mines over the culvert will be detected. That mine sweep teams be trained to make a close visual check of the road shoulders to detect disturbances of the base course material, to inspect and to detect the location of wires. A combat lessons learned letter on this subject was distributed by XXIV Corps on 1 September 1970.

1. (U) Background

2. (U) Summary

3. (U) Material

4. (U) Other

5. (U) ARVN Engineer

(a) Construction: ARVN engineers have become thoroughly competent in road field construction. They are hampered somewhat by lack of some authorized equipment and construction material. However, the most glaring deficiency is the lack of proper management of these engineering assets. In some instances construction in Military Region 1. Unfortunately, in the past, XXIV Corps has not applied the idea of Vietnamization to this program. ARVN have constructed nearly all tactical roads to date based on ARVN troops. In the case of the two roads being constructed by ARVN, I Area Logistics Command could not furnish materials. Materials were only furnished by the US.

(b) Evaluation: ARVN Engineers should be given sole responsibility for providing their own tactical roads. This includes planning, providing materials, and constructing the road as well as maintaining the roads after construction.

(c) Recommendations: That this Headquarters continue to encourage ARVN to assume more of this responsibility and that MACV be aware of this problem, particularly since ARVN claims no ability to plan for and obtain

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funds for road construction. Continued emphasis is being applied by Corps for further Vietnamization of engineer material supply system.

(2) Adequacy of Primary Lines of Communication.

(a) Observations: During the current monsoon season, heavy rains and high water have caused several culverts on QL-1 to be washed out and long stretches of the highway to be underwater.

(b) Evaluation: The culverts through this area were underdesigned and insufficient subgrade fill was employed to raise the road to its required level.

(c) Recommendation: QL-1 through the lowlands in Southern Military Region I should have much larger culvert capacity and the road bed should be as high as the railroad bed in the same area. Corps continue to place increased emphasis on road maintenance for this section during wet weather.

(3) Traffic Fatalities

(a) Observations: On 15 July 1970, a Vietnamese bicycle rider was struck and killed by a US Military vehicle. The victim was evacuated to a US Military hospital where he was pronounced dead-on-arrival. The body was immediately released to the father of the victim and returned to the scene of the accident where a large crowd had gathered. The crowd prevented the US vehicle and its occupants from leaving and demanded VNS\$500.000. The body was then placed in front of the US vehicle, candles lit and mourners surrounded it as they began their religious chants. This further aroused the crowd and increased the demands of the family for an on the spot claim settlement.

(b) Evaluation: Had the body not been returned to the accident scene it would have been easier to control the emotions of the crowd, and allowed for more rational resolution of the Vietnamese demands. In addition it would serve to reduce the threat to the lives of the US Military personnel involved who frequently were threatened with bodily harm by weapon brandishing Vietnamese civilians.

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(c) Recommendation: That every effort be made by US and Vietnamese medical personnel to prevent the immediate release of an accident victim where his presence can be used to further enrage the local authority.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl

as

Incl 1 & 2, 1A



L. B. PROCTOR

LTC, AGC

Acting Adjutant General

20 DEC 1970

AVHDO-DC (12 Nov 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-15 (R2)(U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96371

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPCP-DT,
APO 96518

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1970 from Headquarters, XXIV
Corps.

A. Sub-paragraphs concerning "ARVN Engineer Units," page 38, paragraph
4.1.1. This Headquarters is currently working with Headquarters MACV
to develop a plan which will allow ARVN to divorce itself from
the MACV supply system. The end product of this joint effort will be a
comprehensive ARVN logistical system which will provide construction material
and equipment support to ARVN engineer field units. While this plan is
being developed primarily for ARVN engineer units engaged in IAD construc-
tion, it appears that increasing the strength of the ARVN logistical
system will reduce the support required from US units throughout Vietnam.
MACV and DA support is requested in order for ARVN to develop a
strong logistical system capable of supporting all ARVN field units without
MACV support. This has been advised.

2. BY THE COMMANDER:



Clark W. Stevens Jr.

Captain, AGC

Assistant Adjutant General

4. Form:
XXIV Corps

GPOP-DT (12 Nov 70) 2d Ind (U)


SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, XXIV Corps, for Period
Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 28 JAN 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department
of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


L.M. OZAKI
CPT. AGO
A : AG

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12 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

TROOP LIST AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1970

XXIV CORPS

HHC, XXIV Corps

24th PI Det

212th Avn Bn (OPCON)

Co C, 5th Special Forces Gp (A) (OPCON)

204th MI Det

29th Civil Affairs Co

48th Chemical Det

108th Trans Co (CAR)

2d Plt, Co B, 504th MP Bn (OPCON)

31st Mil Hist Det

7th Psyops Bn (GS)

437th Dental Det (Atchd)

37th Det, 5th Weather Sqdn (Atchd)

XXIV CORPS ARTILLERY

HHC, XXIV Corps Arty

1st Bn, 44th Arty (A4)(SP)

Btry G, 29th Arty (SLF)

Btry G, 65th Arty (MG)

2d Bn, 94th Arty (P"/175)(SP)

108th Artillery Gp

HHC, 108th Artillery Gp

8th Bn, 4th Arty (8"/175)(SP)

1st Bn, 39th Arty (155)(SP)

1st Bn, 83d Arty (8"/175)(SP)

Btry F, 26th Arty (TAB)

235th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)

239th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)

240th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)

245th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)

250th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ-4A Radar)

III MAF

Hq

1st MP Bn

1st Radio Bn (-)

Comm Spt Co (Rein), 7th Comm Bn

2d Combined Action Gp

A Co (Rein), 7th Engr Bn

~~INCLOSURE 2~~

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOS-65 (R2) (U)

1ST MARDIV

HQ Bn (-)

1st Mar Regt

HQ Co

1st Bn

2d Bn

3d Bn

5th Mar Regt

HQ Co

1st Bn

2d Bn

3d Bn

11th Mar Regt

HQ Btry

1st Bn

2d Bn

4th Bn (-)

3d 4th How Btry

1st Recon Bn (-)

Det, 1st Force Recon Co

1st Engr Bn

1st Med Bn (-)

1st MT Bn (-)

Co C, 1st SP Bn

11th MT Bn

FLC

1ST MAW

MWHG-1

MAG 11

MAG 16

MWCG-18

101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION (AMBL)

1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (AMBL)

HHC, 1st Bde

3d Bn (AMBL), 506th Inf

1st Bn (AMBL), 127th Inf

1st Bn (AMBL), 501st Inf

2d Bn (AMBL), 502d Inf

42d Inf Flt (Scout Dog)

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (AMBL)

HHC, 2d Bde

2d Bn (AMBL), 501st Inf

2d Bn (AMBL), 327th Inf

1st Bn (AMBL), 502d Inf

47th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)

34th Public Information Det (PID Svc)

3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (AMBL)

HHC, 3d Bde

3d Bn (AMBL), 137th Inf

1st Bn (AMBL), 506th Inf

2d Bn (AMBL), 500th Inf

58th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)

25th Public Information Det (PID Svc)

101st Airborne Division Artillery (AMBL)

HHC, 101st Airborne Division Artillery (AMBL)

2d Bn (AMBL), 319th Arty (105)(T)

2d Bn (AMBL), 320th Arty (105)(T)

1st Bn (AMBL), 321st Arty (105)(T)

2d Bn (AMBL), 322nd Arty (105)(T)

4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 323rd Arty (AMBL)

268th Trans Det (Acft Maint)

331st Trans Det (Acft Maint)

388th Trans Det (Acft Maint)

Btry A (AVN), 377th Arty (AMBL) (APA)

650th Trans Det (Acft Maint)

266th FA Det (Surveillance Radar)

101st Aviation Group (101st AVG) (AMBL)

HHC, 101st Avn Gp (101st AVG) (AMBL)

101st Avn Bn (Aslt Hel) (AMBL)

499th Trans Det (Acft Maint)

510th Trans Det (Acft Maint)

516th Trans Det (Acft Maint)

527th Trans Det (Acft Maint)

158th Avn Bn (Aslt Hel) (AMBL)

159th Trans Det (Acft Maint)

168th Trans Det (Acft Maint)

273d Trans Det (Acft Maint)

169th Trans Det (Acft Maint)

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

159th Avn Bn (Aslt Spt Hel) (AMBL)

325th Avn Det

478th Avn Co (Hvy Hel)

625th Trans Det (Acft Maint)

327th Trans Det (Acft Maint)

649th Trans Det (Acft Maint)

163d Avn Co (CS) (AMBL)

530th Trans Det (Acft Maint)

359th Avn Det (Div)

101st Airborne Division Support Command

RHC and Band

5th Trans Bn (Acft Maint & Sup) (AMBL)

326th Med Bn (AMBL)

426th SOS Bn (AMBL)

801st Maint Bn (AMBL)

101st Admin Co (AMBL)

101st Airborne Division Troops

RHC, 101st Abn Div (AMBL)

2d Bn (AMBL) 17th Cav

507th Trans Det (Acft Maint)

332d Trans Det (Acft Maint)

333d Trans Det (Acft Maint)

Co L (Range) (AMBL) 75th Inf

36th Engr Bn (AMBL)

501st Sig Bn (AMBL)

101st MP Co (AMBL)

577th Inf Flt (Cbt Tracker)

265th Radio Research Co

10th Cml Flt (DS)

20th Cml Det (CER Ser)

22d Mil Hist Det

101st MI Co (AMBL)

OF LOC 6, 5th Weather Det (USAF)

20th TASS (USAF)

Non Divisional Units

Det 3, 7th Psyops Bn (DS of Div)

7th CA Plt, 20th CA Co (DS of Div)

AMERICAL DIVISION

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12 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS GSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

11th Infantry Brigade

HHC, 11th Inf Bde

1st Bn, 20th Inf

3d Bn, 1st Inf

4th Bn, 3d Inf

4th Bn, 21st Inf

59th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)

90th Cml Det

31st Public Information Det (Fld Svc)

327th Avn Det

Combat Weather Team 1

196th Infantry Brigade

HHC, 196th Inf Bde

1st Bn, 45th Inf

2d Bn, 1st Inf

3d Bn, 21st Inf

4th Bn, 31st Inf

48th Inf (Scout Dog)

27th Cml Det

10th Public Information Det (Fld Svc)

198th Infantry Brigade

HHC, 198th Inf Bde

1st Bn, 6th Inf

1st Bn, 52d Inf

5th Bn, 46th Inf

Trp H, 17th Co

57th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)

87th Cml Det

American Division Artillery

HHC, Div Arty

1st Bn, 14th Art. (105)(T)

1st Bn, 82d Arty (155/8") (T/SP)

3d Bn, 16th Arty (155)(T)

3d Bn, 18th Arty (8"/175)(SP)

3d Bn, 82d Arty (105)(T)

Btry B (-), 1st Bn, 14th Arty

6th Bn, 11th Arty (105)(T)

Metre Section, 2d Bn, 11th Arty

Btry G, 55th Arty (MG)

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12 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

251st FA Det (Radar)

252d FA Det (Radar)

271st FA Det (Radar)

16th Combat Aviation Group

RHC, 16th CAG (Cbt)

14th Combat Avn Bn

71st Avn Co (Aslt Hel)

116th Avn Co (Aslt Hel) (OPCON)

132d Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)

174th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)

176th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)

178th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)

196th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel) (OPCON)

534th Med Det

756th Med Det

123d Avn Bn (Cbt) (Inf Div)

Trp D, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav

Co E, 723d Maint Bn

Trp F, 8th Cav

335th Trans Co

362d Avn Det

Americal Division Support Command

RHC and Band

23d Admin Co

23d Med Bn

23d S&T Bn

723d Maint Bn (-)

63d Inf Plt (Cbt Tracker)

Co G (Ranger), 75th Inf

Americal Combat Center (PROV)

Chu Lai Defense Command (PACV)

Headquarters Americal Division

RHC, Americal Division

1st Sqdn, 1st Cav (-)

Trp E, 1st Cav

Trp F, 17th Cav

26th Engr Bn

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Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

523d Sig Bn

COMSEC Contact Team #2

23d MP Co

146th MP Plt, 504th MP Bn

3d Mil Hist Det

635th MI Co

324th Radio Research Co

OP LOC 7, 5th Weather Det (USAF)

Non Divisional Units

6th CA Plt, 29th CA Co (DS of Div)

Det 3, 7th Payup Bn (DS of Div)

USASSG, ACSI DA

1ST BRIGADE, 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZED)

HHC, 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech)

1st Bn, 1st Inf

1st Bn, 61st Inf (Mech)

1st Bn, 17th Armor

3d Sqdn, 4th Arm Cav (1) (Atch: Less D Trp)

4th Bn, 1st Arty (55) (SF)

75th Support Bn (GS)

Co P (Ranger), 1st Inf

Co C, 2d Bn, 14th Armor (Atch)

Trp A, 4th Sqdn, 1st Cav (Atch)

Trp C, 3d Sqdn, 1st Cav (OPCON)

Co A, 7th Bn, 1st

208th Sig Bn

43d Inf Plt (Sen. Org)

77th Combat Engineer Det

96th Cml Det

48th Public Information Det (Fld Svc)

517th MI Det (Atch)

407th Radio Research Det

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AGDA-A(M) (31 Mar 71) DAMO-ODU 704015

6 April 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV
Corps, Period Ending 31 October 1970 (U)

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2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.
3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans ATTN: DAMO-ODU within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

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Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations:

a. (U) Personnel. None.

b. (C) Intelligence/Counterintelligence.

(1) Specialized Interrogations.

(a) Observation: XXIV Corps Interrogation of Prisoners of War Branch assigned one interrogator the function of conducting interrogations of all detainees from transportation units in Military Region 1. To prepare himself for this specialized function, the interrogator conducted several studies on the operational area, mission and methods used by various transportation units.

(b) Evaluation: This technique provided the interrogator with a thorough knowledge in one specific area of enemy activity, enabling him to interrogate more critically and thoroughly in this field.

(c) Recommendation: That units use this technique where specialized interrogation is desirable. This technique can be used for collection emphasis on specific units or specific types of units, e.e., sapper, artillery, reconnaissance, etc.

(2) Daily G2 Update Briefings.

(a) Observation: XXIV Corps G2 holds a daily update briefing for the ACoFS, G2 in which each division of the G2 Branch and the 525th Military Intelligence Group presents the most recent and significant items of information and intelligence. A summary of significant events for that day is also presented. Other agencies present briefings as required.

(b) Evaluation: The G2 Update Briefing results in a consolidation of pertinent information from all the divisions of G2 and related agencies. Because all the divisions as well as the 525th Military Intelligence Group are represented, there is an increase in coordination of intelligence and cooperation. Further, the G2 Update Briefing has proven to be a good training testing period for briefers and briefs to be presented to the General Staff.

(c) Recommendation: That headquarters having a large number of intelligence agencies which must work in coordination consider using a similar briefing or conference.

(3) Remote Firing Device Ambush.

(a) Observation: Commander Task Unit 221.1.4 at Hoi An has had success utilizing remote firing devices in conjunction with sensor

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SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
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Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

strings for mechanical ambushes. Claymore mines were placed to make a kill zone. The claymores would be detonated when sensors indicated movement in the kill zone.

(b) Evaluation: Two successful ambushes resulted in positive kill assessment with reduced hazard to friendly unit. Three failures can be attributed to erroneous technical information concerning the types of batteries to be used in remote firing device equipment. The battery type was corrected by COMUSMACV message 241027Z October 1970 (C).

(c) Recommendation: New remote firing device equipment is to be issued in the near future. Recommend this equipment and earlier model equipment be considered for further use in exploiting this ambush technique.

c. (U) Operations.

(1) Review of Contingency Plans.

(a) Observation: During the month of October 1970, Typhoons Joan and Kate endangered Military Region I. It was found that appropriate contingency plans were outdated and in need of revision and that responsible personnel were unfamiliar with all aspects of the plan.

(b) Evaluation: The typhoon/tropical storm season is generally in October - November and also coincides with the beginning of the northeast monsoon season in Military Region I. Personnel turnover creates a loss of expertise in all duty positions. Since these storms are seasonal, it is essential that all personnel become familiar with the appropriate plan prior to the season. Plans should also be reviewed, prior to the storm season, to insure that they are correct and all procedures are up to date.

(c) Recommendations: That all commanders and staff officers institute programs to insure that newly assigned personnel are familiar with seasonal contingency plans, as well as all contingency plans, and that a continuous contingency plan review is in effect. This is especially important in short tour areas such as Vietnam.

d. (U) Organization. None.

e. (C) Training.

(1) Unit Employment Procedures for the Mechanical Ambush.

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(a) Observation: Recent field experience with Mechanical Ambushes reveals that faulty procedures and carelessness on the part of emplacement and recovery personnel has resulted in accidents causing injury and death to friendly personnel.

(b) Evaluation: Mechanical Ambushes have produced significant results in terms of enemy killed, denial of rapid enemy movement and early warning for friendly positions. However, the Mechanical Ambush is a dangerous weapon. Responsible individuals are required for emplacement and recovery. These individuals must be trained in correct procedures until proficient. Accurate Mechanical Ambush locations must be reported and personnel within a unit position must be briefed on Mechanical Ambush locations.

(c) Recommendation: That units utilize command emphasis and SOPs to establish personnel selection criteria, training procedures, emplacement and recovery procedures, location reporting and briefing of individuals on Mechanical Ambushes in order to limit casualties to only those inflicted on the enemy. A letter explaining unit employment procedures for the Mechanical Ambush was distributed by XXIV Corps on 21 September 1970.

(2) Enemy Mine Techniques.

(a) Observation: The Viet Cong and NVA have successfully employed a technique of emplacing antivehicular mines above metal culverts in order to escape detection by mine detectors. In August 1970, this technique was responsible for the death of three US soldier, the wounding of 28 others and the destruction of one 2½ ton truck.

(b) Evaluation: This mine was emplaced directly above a culvert to prevent mechanical detection. Emplacement was accomplished by removing base rocks from the shoulder of the road directly above the culvert, then digging an inclined hole to the desired depth and location directly under the edge of the pavement. Once the mine was emplaced, the soil was replaced and the base rock carefully relaid to conceal any disturbance. Liquid asphalt was poured over the rocks, but was spread to conceal the fresh asphalt and finally, the area was rolled with a tire to give the entire shoulder a uniform appearance. The wire was concealed by the rocks and asphalt on the road shoulder and by dense vegetation for a distance of 20 meters off the road. The mine was command detonated from a point 100 meters from the road. Considerable effort was exerted by the enemy in emplacing the mine. Based on this

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success, it can be expected that this technique will be used on QL-1 and other hard surface roads in Military Region 1.

(c) Recommendation: That this technique of mine employment be disseminated within all units. That mine sweep teams be trained in the proper method of detecting a mine above a metal culvert by adjusting the sensitivity of the detector until the culvert is no longer picked up and then sweeping over the culvert. By using this method, metallic mines over the culvert will be detected. That mine sweep teams be trained to make a close visual check of the road shoulders to detect disturbances of the base course material or the asphalt and to detect the location of wires. A combat lessons learned letter on this subject was distributed by XXIV Corps on 3 September 1970.

f. (U) Logistics. None.

g. (U) Communications. None.

h. (U) Materiel. None.

i. (U) Other.

(1) ARVN Engineer Units.

(a) Observation: ARVN Engineer Units have become increasingly competent in routine field engineering. They are hampered somewhat by lack of some authorized equipment and construction material. However, the most glaring deficiency is the lack of proper management of these engineering assets. An example is road construction in Military Region 1. Unfortunately, in the past, XXIV Corps has not applied the idea of Vietnamization to this program. US units have constructed nearly all tactical roads to fire bases, including ARVN bases. In the case of the two roads being constructed by ARVN, I Area Logistics Command could not furnish materials. Materials are being furnished by the US.

(b) Evaluation: ARVN Engineers should be given sole responsibility for providing their own tactical roads, to include planning, providing materials, and constructing the roads as well as maintaining the roads after construction.

(c) Recommendation: That this headquarters continue to encourage ARVN to assume more of this responsibility and that MACV be aware of this problem, particularly since ARVN claims no ability to plan for and obtain

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fund for road construction. Continued emphasis is being applied by Corps for further Vietnamization of engineer material supply system.

(2) Adequacy of Primary Lines of Communication.

(a) Observation: During the current monsoon season, heavy rains and high water have caused several culverts on QL-1 to be washed out and long stretches of the highway to be underwater.

(b) Evaluation: The culverts through this area were underdesigned and insufficient subgrade fill was employed to raise the road to its required level.

(c) Recommendation: QL-1 through the lowlands in Southern Military Region 1 should have much larger culvert capacity and the road bed should be as high as the railroad bed in the same area. Corps continue to place increased emphasis on road maintenance for this section during wet weather.

(3) Traffic Fatalities.

(a) Observation: On 15 July 1970 a Vietnamese bicycle rider was struck and killed by a US Military vehicle. The victim was evacuated to a US Military Hospital where he was pronounced dead-on-arrival. The body was immediately released to the father of the victim and returned to the scene of the accident where an emotion charged crowd had gathered. The crowd prevented the US vehicle and its occupants from leaving, and demanded VN \$500,000. The body was then placed in front of the US vehicle, candles lit and mourners surrounded it and began their religious chants. This further aroused the crowd and hardened the demands of the family for an on the spot claim settlement.

(b) Evaluation: Had the body not been returned to the accident scene it would have been easier to cool the emotions of the crowd, and allowed for more rational resolution of the Vietnamese demands. In addition it would serve to reduce the threat to the lives of the US Military personnel involved who frequently were threatened with bodily harm by weapon brandishing Vietnamese civilians.

(c) Recommendation: That every effort be made by US and Vietnamese medical personnel to prevent the immediate release of an accident victim where his presence can be used to further enrage the local authority.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



L. B. PROCTOR
LTC, AGC
Acting Adjutant General

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